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ISOLATED KNOWLEDGE

PERHAPS the most general form of objection which those who have been variously labeled "instrumentalists," "experimentalists," and even "pragmatists" have brought against other theories of knowledge—idealistic and realistic, monistic and pluralistic—is that their treatment of knowledge has over-isolated it. The history of epistemology, say these critics, is a long, sad tale of futile struggles with difficulties arising from the failure to treat the problem of knowledge as a part of the bigger problem of living, while recognizing at the same time that knowing as a *part* of living is also a part of *living*. They insist that this isolation makes the treatment of knowledge similar to an attempt to give an account of the action of the brain, of the sun, or of any other thing without connecting it with the action of anything else. In the course of such isolated treatment a point is reached sooner or later where these neglected activities have to be reckoned with. They then may be "externally" attached to the process of knowing—"realism"; or be declared to have been "implicitly involved" and recognized (if somewhat algebraically) all along,—"idealism." But a tardy, half-hearted, exotic recognition of these connections complicates rather than solves the difficulties which have forced it. The result is that these outstanding activities keep asserting themselves in the theories which have ignored them in the form of antinomies and of frequent forced appeals from each side to the other for assistance.

The general form which this isolation takes in all theories infected by it is, as Dewey has pointed out, the conception of knowing as an act of something whose nature it is just to perform this act.[1] In a scholastically abstract and formal way the difficulties begin to show at once. For if knowing is an act of a being whose sole or essential nature is to know, how can that being be and fail to know, or fail to know and be? And we can not dispose of this by an admission on

[1] *Cf.* Dewey's "Brief Studies in Realism," this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 393 ff., 496 ff.

the side, *e. g.*, as a psychologist or sociologist or as just a plain human being, that as a matter of fact this knowing being *has* some other characteristics, if in our theory of knowledge we attempt to ignore them or treat them as mere "accidents" of his character as a knowing being. I say "attempt," etc., for now as in the palmiest days of scholasticism these other characters force our recognition whenever we assume that the knower does not know everything or know all the time, or that he may fail to know and still be. For it is precisely these other characters, these "accidents" that give the knower his being when and in so far as he fails to know.

Nor, so far as this difficulty is concerned, does it make any difference whether this knowing being is called "a mind" or "a being with a nervous system," if, in our theory, we treat the knower as a being whose only or essential nature is to know—especially if we have defined knowing as an "external relation" in which this being stands to something else. In this event the being with a nervous system finds itself in the same embarrassments as a "mind." It is doubtless more difficult consistently to treat a red-blooded being with a nervous system as a mere knower than a "mind," but in so far as it is so treated, or mistreated, the difficulties are the same.[2]

One of the most valiant attempts to meet these difficulties without the recognition of isolation as their source is to be found in Mr. Bertrand Russell's "The Problems of Philosophy," most of which is devoted avowedly to the theory of knowledge. It is not to be supposed that because this volume appears in "The Home University Library" series and is written in a charmingly direct and simple style that it is not to be taken seriously by "technical" readers. If the constant use and careful definition of such terms as "sensation," "sense-data," "mind," "particular," "universal," "judgment," "truth," "error," etc., be "technical" the technical reader has little cause for complaint.

The book is also noteworthy as an exposition of the philosophical ideas of a renowned mathematician, which does not resort, at crucial points in the argument, to formulæ of the highly specialized discipline of mathematical logic. Mr. Russell has beautifully shown that it is not only possible, but easy for a mathematician to set forth his philosophical notions in simple, vivid, current English.

There are some who have high hopes that the present alliance

[2] Professor Perry, speaking for the "Platform" realists says: "The realist grants that 'one who is knower is in relation to objects something else than their knower.' "Neo-realism," page 135. And elsewhere he makes the knower a being with a nervous system. But the question is: how far in his theory of knowledge he makes a *connection* between the knower as knower, and the knower as something else.

between mathematics and philosophy is to introduce greater "logical rigor" into philosophical thinking. It is possible that this overlooks the consideration that the "precision" of mathematics is in proportion to the degree of its abstractness; and that unless the subject-matter of philosophy can be reduced to the same degree of abstractness as mathematics, the concepts and methods which secure precision in the latter may produce only confusion in the former. However, those who cherish this expectation will be the first to agree that if difficulties are encountered in an exposition which has the mathematical training of Mr. Russell behind it, they must be charged to the standpoint itself, not to mistake in its applications.[3]

Mr. Russell's account does not begin, as some might expect, with the general character of knowledge. It assumes that we understand what knowledge means and strikes at once into the distinction between knowledge which admits of no doubt and knowledge which has the possibility of error. The former is "immediate" knowledge or knowledge by "acquaintance"; the latter is mediate or "derived" knowledge and is in the form of judgments and inferences. As to the general character of immediate knowledge, "we shall say we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware without the intermediary of any process of inference or knowledge of truths."[4] And "knowledge of truths" is defined as knowledge "in the sense which applies to our beliefs and convictions; that is, to what are called judgments."[5]

As for *what* is known—the "objects" of knowledge—in immediate knowledge there are: (1) the sense-data, "such things as colors, sounds, smells, hardnesses, etc.," which are produced by the action on "us" of "physical" objects existing in "physical" space;

[3] I hope that what follows is not over-captious. It is frankly an attempt to develop some of the antinomies, the "inner dialectic," if one pleases, of the conception of knowledge as an external relation between a "mind" and other things, with mind regarded as something whose "essential character" is just to be in this relation. And if part of the discussion is reminiscent of Green's criticism of Locke it should be said that the similarity between some of Mr. Russell's ideas and those of Locke calls for some of the sort of negative criticism Green leveled at Locke, even if one believes that much of Green's reconstruction is involved in the same difficulties.

[4] Page 173.

[5] In the formal classification there is a difficulty in completely identifying mediate and doubtful knowledge with judgments when, further on, we encounter "intuitive" and "perfectly self-evident" knowledge of "truths" after knowledge of truths has been defined (page 69) as knowledge "which applies to our beliefs and judgments," and after we have been told that it is precisely in beliefs and judgments that the possibility of error is found. This discrepancy is largely nullified, however, by so emasculating these perfectly certain judgments that they merely state "what is given in sense" (page 171) or the universals given in "acquaintance."

(2) memories, psychological processes, known by introspection, and "probably," not certainly, a knowledge of the self; (3) some universals and the content of intuitive judgments. Through mediate knowledge are known: (1) the "physical" or "real" objects corresponding to and "producing" the sense-data; and (2) "everything which can be deduced from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction."

Meanwhile throughout this attractive presentation of these kinds and objects of knowledge one is haunted by the question: What is meant by "knowing," mediate or immediate? Turning the pages again with this in mind, we find that the first statements about knowing in general identify it with such "acts" as seeing, hearing, touching, or believing[6]—acts which "we" perform on something or toward something called the "objects of the act."[7] If we begin at once to raise such questions as: What is the nature of this "act"? what is the "we," and what is the character of the "object,"—let it not be said that this betrays at the start a carping critic, until we see how far the argument turns on the ambiguities of these terms.

The first of anything like explicit responses to these queries appears in the criticism of Berkeley. Mr. Russell finds the weakness in Berkeley's position is revealed when we detect the equivocation in the term idea which is used to mean: (1) the "act" of knowing which Mr. Russell agrees is "undoubtedly mental" and "in" the mind; and (2) the "object" which is never "in," but only "before" the mind.[8] The "act" of knowing, then, is "mental"; and the "I" or "we" which knows is something called "a mind." Obviously we look at once for something more about this "mental act" and the nature of "mind." And on the next page[9] we find that "the main characteristic of a mind is the faculty of being acquainted with (*i. e.*, of immediately knowing) things other than itself"; and that "acquaintance with objects consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind's power of knowing things." Observe that in the last statement the mind's "act" of knowing has been reduced to a "relation between" the mind and something else. When we reach the treatment of judgment and the problem of truth and error,

[6] Pages 10 ff.

[7] Here the discussion could be given a very different direction by challenging at once the assumption that such acts as seeing, hearing, and touching are acts of *knowing*. They may easily *become* part of a process of knowing, but are they *per se* knowing? But this discussion is committed to the enterprise of following the lead of Mr. Russell's conceptions and theses.

[8] The application of this to the mind's knowledge of (or "relations to") itself is not discussed.

[9] Page 66.

we shall find this "relation" becoming an "act again."[10] But for the present let us accept this reduction and follow its lead. Our net result so far is: immediate knowing is a relation—and I suppose we must say "external"—between other things and a "mind" whose essential character is just to be in this relation. The questions here are: What more is to be said of this relation? And if it is the essential nature of a mind to be in this relation of immediate knowing with other things, why has it, confessedly, this relation with so very few things? And just what is meant by the "certainty" of this relation?

As for the nature of the relation, there is the name "acquaintance." But that does not carry us very far. However, one other thing may be said of it for whatever it is worth. The relation is such that the "other things" are *immediately* "before" the mind. Further than this, apparently, we can not go. "Correspondence," which is treated in the chapter on Truth and Falsehood, does not apply here. Correspondence is not a relation between the mind and the things immediately "before" the mind, but between those things immediately "before" the mind, sense-data and certain universals, and things not immediately "before the mind," such as "physical" objects and other minds.

But once more, if this immediate relation of the mind to the "other things" is thus taken as an indefinable, and if it is the essential character of a mind to be in this relation, then such questions as: Why is it in this relation with so few things, and why, therefore, is not a lack of this relation (*pace* the objection of negative definition) as essential a character as its possession, become at once relevant and important? And they get added force when we find that this limitation is not the merely negative one of capacity, but that the whole world of "physical" objects and other selves—truly a large area—are, by their nature, shut out beyond all "hope" from this relation.

Here, possibly, some one may suggest that if one were to say, "the essential nature of the eye is to see other things than itself, this would not imply that the eye must see everything or see all the time." To which the reply would be: The analogy breaks; for "seeing" is far from being an indefinable, not to say "external," relation "between" the eye and other things. We can at once show how and why the eye can see some things and not others. On the other hand, if we start by defining "seeing" as an external relation "between"

[10] I am aware of the doctrine of "motion" as a transitive asymmetrical relation, but—not presuming to question its value elsewhere—I doubt if even the most hardy mathematical realist would attempt to apply it in detail to the kind of action involved here.

other things and something called an eye, about which we can say nothing except that its essential nature is to be in the relation of seeing to these other things, then the question: "Why does it stand in this relation to some things and not to others," is in order. And it surely would be too palpably mendicant to suggest that we must simply accept the empirical "fact" of this limitation.

Moreover, as we pass to the account of the certainty of the knowledge of the sense-data this limitation is far from being taken as empirically given. Here there is plenty of explanation of this certainty. And if some of the explanation is difficult to reconcile with knowledge as an "external" and indefinable relation, other parts of it are equally difficult to square with the conception of the "act" of knowing as something "mental." Taking first the certainty of the sense-data, we have the following: "Although we are doubting the existence of the physical table, we are not doubting the existence of the sense-data which made us think there was a table. We are not doubting that while we look a certain color and shape appear to us, and while we press a certain sensation of hardness is experienced by us. *All this which is psychological* we are not calling in question."[11] Here not only the "we," but the sense-data and everything included in such processes as "looking" and pressing, are "all psychological." The term "psychological," to be sure, covers a multitude of things these days; but if there be any question of its "mental" connotation here, a few pages further on the whole case for immediate certainty is summed up in this way: "Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty."

But these passages occur before the issue between realism and idealism is explicitly raised. Turning now to the explanation of the certainty of the sense-data given in the midst of the criticism of Berkeley's idealism, Mr. Russell finds that while Berkeley was wrong in identifying the thing known (here the sense-data) with the "act" of knowing which "is undoubtedly in the mind," "he was right in treating the sense-data which constitute our perception of a tree as subjective in the sense that they depend on us as much as upon the tree."[12] Follow now the phrase "depends on us." With immediate knowing defined as an "act" of a "mind" or as "a relation between" a mind and other things there surely is ground to expect that "us" here means us as "minds." Doubtless this makes an odd-looking realism; and as we are here in the midst of an explicit defense of that doctrine we should not, perhaps, be so surprised to find that "depends on us" is at once made to mean "depends on our sense organs." "Our previous arguments concerning color did not

[11] Page 27, italics mine.

[12] Page 30.

prove it to be mental; they only proved that its existence depends *on the relation of our sense organs to the physical object.*"[13]

Aside from the striking difference between this and the other account of the sense-data where the "us" and the "looking" and "pressing" were "all psychological," are we not entitled to wonder how an interaction between "physical" bodies in "physical" space (for the sense organs are of course in "physical" space along with all other "physical" bodies) none of which is "immediately before" the mind, produces a third sort of thing, sense-data, which is "immediately before" the mind? And in the face of the admittedly hypothetical inferential character of "physical" space we could scarcely be asked to take this "empirically." Behold then our dilemma: To maintain realism "us," in the phase "depends on us," must mean " our sense organs": to save immediacy and certainty it is taken as "minds." But to take it "as sense organs" leaves the object still in the hypothetical region of "physical" space not "immediately before the mind"; to take it as "mind" makes a realism that is in anything but name difficult to distinguish from idealism.

Possibly some one may here propose that in taking "us" both as body and mind one is simply recognizing the given dual character of the self. The reply would be: first, that the self is not here so treated. It is not taken in each case as *both* "mental" and "physical"; but is first one then the other. If the distinction between the "physical" and the "psychical" were consistently taken as falling inside the self or selves we should get a different type of realism. Second, it is again difficult to see how the "physical" body which dwells in the outer darkness of "physical" space where it can never hope to be immediately "before," much less in "contact," with the mind, can be a very intimate part of the self. Verily Berkeley has his revenge; not that his difficulties are any the less; but that the embarrassments of both spring from the common conception of knowing as an external relation between other things and a mind whose essential nature is just to be in this relation. Berkeley's God, the Bradleyan absolute, and Mr. Russell's "physical" object are epistemologically in the same case.

On the side of *what* is known of the "objects," the discussion, so far, has dealt chiefly with the sense-data. But equally interesting problems arise in connection with the other contents of immediate knowledge. First, is it not paradoxical that immediate knowledge should be "absolutely certain" and yet it be uncertain whether there is this immediate and perfectly certain knowledge of the self? If it is possible and even "probable" that we have this imme-

[13] Page 65. Italics mine.

diate and certain knowledge of the self, may we then *have* it and still be uncertain that we have it?

In the account of the immediate knowledge of universals we observe first that these immediately known universals in no sense "depend on us" as do the sense-data. They are strictly non-mental. Like the "physical" object, they are in a different plane of being from that of the knower. Yet some[14] of them are "immediately before" the mind, while the "physical" object can never hope to be in this position. Why this is so is not clear. There is here no technique of the immediacy of the universals as there is for the sense-data. Doubtless this is much more congruous with the conception of immediacy; but it leaves the exclusion of the "physical" object from immediacy more of a mystery.

Although these universals are immediately before the mind, yet they have to be discovered, "derived" by a process of abstraction from particulars, and in some cases with great difficulty. Obviously this abstracting must be done by the mind itself. Does this mean that what is immediately given to the mind is only "given" after the mind works for it? Again, in this process of abstracting, which is often long and difficult, must there not be possibilities of error? And finally what is to test the completion of the abstraction?

A reconciliation of the immediacy of these universals with their "derivation" may be offered thus: "Certain preliminary and conditioning processes are presupposed in any sort of immediate knowledge. In order immediately to see anything the seer must first be awake and looking. If such preliminary activities are to destroy immediacy, where then is immediacy to be found?" To which the reply is: "*freilich*—nowhere." That is to say, nowhere is *such* an immediacy of the absolute and final sort to be found, where it is an outcome, an outgrowth of antecedent processes. The immediacy of seeing, hearing, which has been achieved in and is still in a process of development is not final; it is always open to disruption and therefore to the need of fresh mediation. How is it possible to admit that things and functions have *grown* and in the same breath make some of them intrinsically "immediate" and others "derived"? All of which is saying, not that there is no distinction between mediate and immediate, but that it is not one of fixed properties belonging each to different sorts of functions and contents. So long as seeing or bearing, or, perhaps better, their results can *be taken for granted* in any act or process they are immediate; the moment they themselves become a part of the problem they lose their immediacy. Again, the appeal to these preliminary activities in the case of

[14] It is admitted (page 171) that "among universals there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which can be known by acquaintance."

seeing presupposes that the "seer" is a being who has some other activities which constitute his being when he is not seeing. But the immediate seer of these universals and sense-data is a "mind" whose essential nature is to see these other things. Where then shall we locate these preliminary activities and how are they to be *connected* with the seeing?

Finally, should not a theory of knowledge which frankly accepts the platonic conception of universals as entities whose character is that they are "shared by" other entities called "particulars," make some disposition of the serious difficulties which the Greeks themselves recognized, and serenely bequeathed to later generations? Even Aristotle found the notion of "sharing" mysterious enough. But perhaps the most fundamental of these difficulties is the dilemma of simple and complex universals which was precipitated by the discovery that these universals "share in," "overlap" each other. The universal triangle "shares in" the universal "line," "angle," and "threeness" as much as does the particular triangle. On the basis of "sharing" what, then, is the difference between the "universal" and the "particular" triangle? When this question of the difference becomes acute, what usually happens is that the basis is suddenly shifted and the particular is distinguished from the universal as a temporal, terrestrial precipitation of the latter. But the universal, celestial, and the particular, terrestrial triangle are the same "complex" of universals in different planes of being. If, on the other hand, we seek escape by way of the "simple" universals, *i. e.*, of universals as ontologically simple entities, we have to face the queries: In what sense can anything absolutely "simple" be "shared by" anything else? And what then is a particular? And if the latter is a temporal complex of these simple universals, have we not, then, to face all the difficulties of atomism?

II

In the treatment of mediate knowledge—knowledge by way of judgment or belief—especially in dealing with the problem of truth and error, the conception of knowledge as an external relation between a mind and other things, and of a mind as something whose nature it is to be in this relation encounters its crucial test. In the account of immediate knowledge the pressure of the question, "how can such a mind be and fail in the relation" is partly relieved by the supposition that it does not fail. But in mediate knowledge we have to face, not merely negative limitation, but positive blunder and failure.

That the general conception of knowledge developed in the ac-

count of immediate knowing is to be carried over if possible into mediate knowing is clear from such general statements as this: "What is called belief or judgment is nothing but this relation of believing or judging which relates a mind to several other things than itself."[15] Formally, this of course agrees with the external-relation conception; materially, all depends on what this "relation of judging" turns out to be.

The first point in which the relation of judging differs from the relation of immediate knowledge is that it is a "plural" relation. That is, in judging, the mind must be related to more than one other thing. This is to pave the way for the possibility of error. If a "mind" called "Othello," should judge *falsely* that Desdemona loves Cassio, "this judgment can not consist in the mind's relation to a single object; for if there were such an object the belief would be true."[16] This means that since knowing so far consists in an undefined relation of the mind to something else if the mind *is* in this relation, it is *in* it, and there can be no error.

However, before considering the problem of truth and error, the distinction between the "single" object of immediate knowledge and the "plural" object of the judgment should be noticed. When we "see" (*i. e.*, immediately know) "a round red patch"—and we might add, "between two trees at the edge of the meadow"—the object is "single"; it is "complex" to be sure, but still "single." But when the mind "judges" that "there is a round red patch," etc., or that "the patch is round and red," the object is more than one. This at once raises the question: is the "singleness" or "plurality" there, in the object, in advance of and independent of the relation to the "mind"; or is it dependent on the relation? Is not "a round red patch between two trees, etc.," "single" because this content is "seen as" single? What can possibly be meant by calling it ontologically "single"? If the "singleness" does mean that it is "seen as" single, then are we to say that in immediate knowledge the mind is related to a "single object" whose "singleness" the mind first makes? On the other hand, if the "singleness" is a property of the object as independent of the relation, we are in trouble with plurality; for this class of judgments—"there is a red patch" or "the patch is red"—are (part of the time) purely "analytic;" "they merely state what is given in sense."[17] In this case are we to understand that the mind, again by a mere act of its own, first bestows upon the object the plurality which the object must have in order to be the

[15] Page 197.
[16] Page 194.
[17] Page 171.

object of the mind's act of judgment? And if so, is not the idealist ready to offer the hand of fellowship?

This problem of singleness and plurality is typical of the difficulties which have always beset a logic which starts by dividing *knowledge* into "immediate" and "mediate." Mill's logic is the classic instance. In general the problem is to make the transition from immediacy to mediacy, or the reverse. The result usually is the production of a third hybrid species of knowing which tries to be both and suffers all of the embarrassments of a dual life. The connecting form in Mr. Russell's system is this analytic judgment of the type—"the patch of red." The difficulty of its position is clearly reflected in the passages concerning it. On the one hand, these judgments are purely "analytic." They "merely state what is given in sense" and therefore have "absolute self-evidence" and "must be true." "In all cases where we know by acquaintance (*e. g.*, by "seeing") a complex fact consisting of certain terms in relation (*e. g.*, "a round red patch," "the shining sun, etc.) we say the truth that these terms are so related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these cases the judgment that the terms are so related *must* be true."[18] On the other hand, all judgments in order to be judgments "must be different from the sense-data from which they are obtained"[19] and must be "liable to error."[20] Hence we find the above passages affirming the absolute self-evidence and truth of these judgments followed at once by the statement that nevertheless any given judgment, *e. g.*, "the sun is shining," "in passing from the perception (*i. e.*, from what is given in sense to the judgment) has to separate out the "sun" and the "shining" as constituents of the fact (*i. e.*, of the perception), and in this process it is possible to commit error."[21] But how does this error occur if the judgment is "merely stating what is given in the perception"? The answer is: "Even where a *fact* has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, a judgment believed to correspond to the fact may not really correspond to the fact."[22] But we have just been assured that "in these cases," that is, where the judgment is "merely stating what is given in sense," it can not fail to correspond to the "fact." The discrepancy obviously turns on the ambiguity in the term "fact." Where the judgment has "absolute self-evidence" and "must be true," the "fact" corresponding to the judgment is simply the sense-data—"the round red patch." But where there is the

[18] Pages 213–14. The parentheses are mine; the italics are Mr. Russell's.
[19] Page 178.
[20] Page 212.
[21] Page 214. Parentheses mine.
[22] *Ibid.*

possibility of error, the "fact" is not the sense-data, but the "physical" object to which the sense-data are supposed to correspond. But where this latter is the object or "fact" with which the judgment means to correspond, obviously the judgment is not confining itself any longer to stating "what is given in sense." Once more the dilemma: to have perfect self-evidence the judgment of perception can only repeat what is already given in the sense-data: but to be a judgment with a judgment's possibility of error, it must go beyond the sense-data.

This brings us to the judgments which frankly profess to transcend the sense-data and to the account of error. We have already seen that the possibility of error is said to rest upon the fact that the mind is in relation to more than one object. But how does mere plurality of objects lead to error? Why should not more than one object be as "immediately before" the mind as one? And in fact it turns out that the mind's relation to a plurality of objects does not in itself contain the possibility of error. This plurality of objects simply prepares the way for the next step in which the real judgment with its liability to error occurs. Having before it a plurality of objects consisting in the simplest cases "of two terms and a relation" the mind can put these objects in an "order" and "direction" of relationship which may or may not correspond to an order and direction of the terms which exists (or subsists) outside the act of judging and may be accordingly true or false. "Thus in every act of judgment there is a mind which judges and there are terms concerning which it judges."[23] Thus the mind "Othello" may judge, *i. e.*, may arrange the terms Desdemona, Cassio, and the relation "loving" in the order and direction of relationship "Desdemona loves Cassio" or "Cassio loves Desdemona." And if the terms are united outside the judgment in the same order and direction of relationship as they have in it, the judgment is true; if not, it is false.[24]

How the conception of judging as a relation "between" the mind and other things is to emerge alive from this account is indeed an interesting question. But our main concern now is with the possibility of truth and error. First, we observe that this account makes the judgment an act of *relating* merely. It reads as if the "real" objects were directly before the mind and as if the only business of the judgment were to put them in the true "order" and "direction" of relationship. The close of the summing up reads: "If the two terms (Desdemona and Cassio) in that order (*i. e.*, the order in the judgment) *are* united by the relation (*i. e.*, *are* united *outside* the

[23] Page 197.

[24] Page 201.

judgment) the belief is true."[25] This reads as if the "terms" in the judgment are the same as those outside; as if the "real" Desdemona and Cassio are immediately known; the thing to be judged being the *relation.* But as soon as we recall the chapters on immediate knowledge we see that the "terms" which are directly before the mind in the judgment and which it is relating are not the "real" Desdemona and Cassio, whether taken as body or soul, but certain sense-data "caused by" the "real" objects. The word "terms" has here the same ambiguity noted above in the word "fact." It covers both the sense-data and the "real" objects.

But it may be said that this ambiguity is harmless since it has already been shown that on pain of subjectivism,[26] we must suppose that the sense-data are caused by and correspond to the "real" objects. But an appeal in the midst of the judgment to the principle of immediacy is perilous. Once admitted, it is difficult to get rid of before it has devoured the whole judgment. Thus at once it will be asked how it happens that the "real" objects in producing the sense-data which corresponds to themselves, produce no corresponding relations. The "real" objects surely do not act out of all relation to one another, nor can their action be unaffected by these relations. How then do the relations escape? And sure enough, when we turn to the statement of the nature of the immediate correspondence between the sense-data and the real objects we find that they do not escape. This correspondence is described as precisely a correspondence of *relations.* It is a correspondence between the relations of the sense-data and the relations of the "real" objects. The account of this correspondence is summed up thus: "We find that although the *relations* of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties derived from their correspondence with the *relations* of the sense-data, the physical objects remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses."[27] Taken at its face, this surely says that the given relations between the sense-data already correspond to relations between the physical (*i. e.,* the "real") objects. And just this correspondence is all the judgment ever hopes to make. There is no correspondence of qualities. What, then, is there left for the judgment to do? All the correspondence possible seems given; the judgment is out of employment; and the possibility of error has vanished.

[25] *Ibid.* Parentheses and italics mine.

[26] Although subjectivism gets us into all kinds of practical absurdities, such as supposing that a patch of color is hungry, angry, etc., yet there is no "logical absurdity" in it (page 34). To many this will seem to constitute sufficient *reductio ad absurdum* of the meaning of "logical" in an isolated logic.

[27] Page 54. The first italics are the author's, the second mine.

But suppose we say that this and other passages similar must not be taken to mean that this correspondence between the relations of the sense-data and the relations of the real objects is complete; they mean only that there is a partial and general correspondence—enough to say that any shift in the relations of the sense-data means some sort of change in the relations of the real objects; but it remains for the judgment to further specify this correspondence. I do not know how mathematical logic handles the case of "partial" or of "general" correspondence of relations, but in terms of ordinary discourse such a statement as the above would mean that the relations between the sense-data, as they are immediately known, do, and do not, correspond to the relations between the real objects and the "do not" is as obvious and important a feature as the "do." But if absence of correspondence with the relations of the real objects is as patent a character of the relations of the sense-data as its presence, what has become of immediate knowledge? Thus it is the turn of mediacy and judgment to devour the whole of knowledge.[28]

Finally, supposing that the correspondence between the relations of the sense-data and those of the real objects is "partial" or "general," and that it is the judgment's work to further specify this correspondence, and that in our illustration the judgment declares that the relations between the sense-data mean that "Desdemona loves Cassio," how is this judgment to be verified? In view of what has preceded, we should not be surprised to find that the answer is that this judgment can be completely verified only in the mind of Desdemona herself.[29] That is to say, the only "mind" that has a strictly "logical"[30] right to the judgment is the one who has no need to make it,—the one to whom the content of the judgment is already given; while the one who needs to make it must claim his right to do so on some other than purely "logical" ground. But let not the idealist mock until he can show how a judgment, which aims to arrange or to "reconstruct" sense-data so that they will correspond with the absolute's system of ideas, can be verified in any mind but that of the absolute. That the mind is the absolute's instead of Desdemona's does not alter in principle the difficulty from the standpoint of Othello who must judge at the risk of both logical certainty and his wife.

[28] Nor would it be in order to appeal, at this point, from "dialectics" to the "fact" that there is immediacy and that there is judgment and inference. The matter in question is not this "fact," but the basis of the distinction and connection between immediacy and judgment.

[29] Page 213.

[30] "Logical," that is, from the standpoint of a purely representational logic.

How near idealism and this type of realism are to each other at this point also appears in the way each deals with this difficulty. From the impossibility of verification of this type of judgment by the finite mind, idealism turns for consolation to the conception of "Degrees of Truth and Reality" which is the epistemological form of the doctrine of "Emanations." In Mr. Russell's exposition, the section which finds that Desdemona's is the only mind which can verify the judgment concerning her passion for Cassio is immediately followed by the doctrine of "degrees of self-evidence,"[31] which, as it is expounded, means "degrees of evidence" or "degrees of verification." But how are these "degrees" to be judged? What is the standard? The answer reveals more common ground. For both, the "criterion" for these "degrees" is something different from the "nature" of truth itself. For idealism, of Professor Royce's type, it is the extent to which the judgment assists in fulfilling some specific finite enterprise, such as the attempt to "sing in tune," etc. For Mr. Russell, the only criterion mentioned for these judgments which deal with particulars is "coherence" which has been explicitly rejected as constituting the "meaning" of truth.[32] The first, and apparently chief reason for the rejection is that "coherence" is relative to difference in point of view resulting in different "systems of coherence," different hypotheses for the same facts."[33] Thus "it may be that with sufficient imagination a novelist might invent a past for the world that would perfectly fit on to what we know and yet be quite different from the real past."[34] But does not this disqualification of coherence for expressing the nature of truth also disqualify it as a criterion? If there may be any number of "inventions" all of which may "perfectly fit onto," *i. e.*, perfectly cohere with, "what we know"[35] and still be mere fictions of the imagination, how can coherence possibly serve as a criterion of truth, *i. e.*, of correspondence with the real facts? To say that while certain judgments may cohere and still be false the probabilities are that they are not, would seem to beg the point. If this means that though cohering judgments may not correspond to "the real facts," all judgments which do so correspond must cohere, some explanation is needed. If we may have perfect coherence without correspondence

[31] Page 218.

[32] Page 191.

[33] The other objection to coherence as expressing the nature of truth is that "it presupposes the laws of logic"—especially the law of contradiction. But doesn't "correspondence" also presuppose the law of contradiction, from Mr. Russell's standpoint?

[34] Page 191.

[35] This must mean with *all* that we know. Also it assumes that it is easy to tell where the perfectly cohering fiction ends and "what we know" begins.

how does correspondence guarantee coherence? Indeed would not the presumption be that where there is an "invention" in perfect coherence with everything we "know," but not corresponding with the facts, a judgment or set of judgments which did correspond would break up the coherence?

More could and should be said about the distinction, rather the lack of distinction, between correspondence of qualities and correspondence of relations and about the whole subject in general of the separation of the "criterion" and "nature" of a thing. But I am already over the limits of this paper. I am keenly aware of the highly "negative" character of this criticism and I realize that many of the questions here proposed could not have been treated in Mr. Russell's book. But if they represent genuine difficulties in the central doctrines of the volume they ought to be raised and discussed somewhere.

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SOCIETIES

NEW YORK BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences, on Monday, April 27, at the psychological laboratory of Columbia University. Afternoon and evening sessions were held, at which the following papers were presented.

Studies in Appetite: GARRY C. MYERS.

The writer continued a study of appetite which was begun by one of his pupils of Juniata College, Miss Margaret Baker. Her questionnaire which she applied to 75 students was extended by the writer to other subjects of college, normal school, and high school-grade, making a total of 483 subjects—258 boys and 225 girls. From the twenty foremost likes and the twenty leading dislikes secured by the questionnaire the names of forty things to eat were printed on slips of paper, shuffled, and presented to each of fifty men and fifty women who were asked to rank the forty things in the order in which they were liked, and to indicate, in case any were disliked, where the dislikes began. Three weeks after the first test the same subjects were surprised by the request to arrange again the items in the order in which they were liked after the manner of the first test.

With 25 of the items another random list was selected and with it 50 boys and 50 girls of the high school and the same number of boys and girls in the grammar schools of Tyrone, Pennsylvania, were tested. As with the college students, a second record after three weeks was obtained.

Only a part of the results of the college subjects were reported. It was found, on the whole, that the results of these tests followed the general order of preference indicated by the results of the questionnaire. Noticeable sex differences obtained in the order of preferences. For example, eggs, which stood first with the men was ranked by the women as sixth; milk stood fourth with the men and twenty-second with the women; salads, twenty-second with the men and fifth with the women; cucumbers, thirty-sixth (fourth from the last) with the men and nineteenth by the women.

The correlation between the median performance of the first and second tests was .96 (Spearman's footrule). The average P.E. of the first performance (average for all items) was 6.50; for the second 7.04.

The individual correlations or indices of consistency ranged from .96 to —.05 with a median at .84 (P.E. 8.00). The second lowest, however, was .39 and third .51. The subjects were most consistent in the arrangement of their foremost likes (first five). For the last five the arrangement was likewise more consistent than for the average, but not so consistent as for the first five.

The median number of items disliked by 50 men was for the first test 7.70 (P.E. 2.79) and for the second test 9.00 (P.E. 4.00). By the 50 girls the corresponding figures were 8.50 (P.E. 3.07) and 8.83 (P.E. 2.83).

Individual Differences in Judgment: LILLIAN S. WALTON.

The material for this experiment consisted of a series of fifteen possible reactions to a given stimulus. These were typewritten on strips of cardboard of approximately uniform size. The subjects were instructed to arrange the material in order of merit with regard to their rhythmical, ethical, practical, tactful, or artistic value.

The material for rhythmical judgment consisted of short stanzas, selected from various poets, ranging from Milton to Kipling: that for artistic judgment of small reprints from various celebrated artists. The practical judgments included a series of budgets prepared for the expenditure of a school-teacher's salary, and a list of punishments for the trivial offenses of a small child.

From the arrangements made by the twenty-five subjects, we estimated the average order. Then we determined the degree of correlation between the average and the individual orders.

From these statistics, we found that, in the subjects studied, there is a greater agreement in ethical judgment than in any other kind. The judgment of art proved to be the poorest, the average correlation with the average judgment being + .68 and + .41, respectively. Next in order to the ethical judgment came the judgment of budgets with an average of + .63.

Arranged in numerical order, the averages for the various judgments were: ethical, .68, practical (budgets), .63, tact, .62, practical (punishments), .48, rhythmical, .42, artistic, .41.

This would seem to suggest that people, in general, judge most nearly alike on matters which are of general interest and differ most on matters which are purely personal.

The individuals in the group differed greatly among themselves. In the average for the various materials, they ranged from 36 per cent. correlation with the average to 16 per cent.

We found no sex differences among our subjects. Since there were only five men and twenty women, our results can only be suggestive, but, in this investigation, the women differed more among themselves than they did from the men. For example, a group of five women school-teachers differed more from a group of five women students than the whole group of women, or any separate group of them, differed from the men.

It was also interesting to note that the group of five women school-teachers had a very much higher correlation with the group, as a whole, on the subject of the practicability of the budgets prepared for a school-teacher's salary, than the rest of the group.

Another point suggested by this experiment is the fact that individuals whose average correlation differed within a very small range had a very much higher general average than those individuals who differed over a very wide range.

Another interesting fact was that those individuals who had the lowest correlation for the judgment of punishments were, in almost every case, people who had had no experience in punishing.

We also found that those individuals who had the highest average were, approximately, the oldest people in the group, whereas those who had the lowest average were about the youngest. These facts suggest that judgment is a matter of practise.

The facts, as here presented, seem to suggest a negative correlation between practical and artistic judgment.

Is There Such a Thing as General Judicial Capacity?: MARY GOLDSBOROUGH ROSS.

Judging in general is a thing about which we all speak with much assurance. In fact, we hardly ever pick up a paper without seeing

an advertisement for a person of "good judgment." However, if we should turn to psychology to see what the psychologists have said about a general capacity of judgment we should find practically nothing. James is the only one who has much to say on the subject and his words are little more than a suggestion for further investigation. It was to determine if there is any general judicial capacity and to find if there is any correlation between different kinds of judgments that this experiment was performed.

The material was of six kinds, involving judgments of art, rhythm, tact, punishments, expenditure of salary, and an ethical judgment. The results proved that we had a social group of subjects, as the highest ratio was 65 per cent., and the lowest 32 per cent., carrying out the two-to-one ratio which usually characterizes a social group.

The individual percentages were obtained by having the subjects arrange the material by the order of merit method. Then we obtained the average order of the group and used this as a standard. We correlated the arrangement of each individual with the standard arrangement, and the resulting per cent. shows the degree to which the individual correlated with the group.

When we had secured these results, we correlated the results of the different groups and found that there is no relation between them. The average of the correlations is —.09. That is, if a person, for instance, is a good judge of rhythm, we might expect him to be an equally good judge of tact, but the chances of this being true are negative. It is the same in any two things you choose; the correlation is practically zero.

Thus we may conclude that, whereas certain persons are endowed with better judgment than others, there is nothing that can be pigeonholed as general judicial capacity, and the fact that a person is good in different kinds of judgment is due to chance only, not to any intercausal relation. There is no correlation whatsoever between the different types of judgment. The highest per cent. obtained by any one in the judgment of ethics was 93 per cent., yet that same person was —.28 per cent. in artistic judgment, so we can safely say that there is no general judicial capacity, nor is there any correlation between the different kinds of judgment.

Equivalence of Repetitions for Recall and Recognition: EDITH F. MULHALL.

The present investigation was to study the equivalence of repetitions for recall and recognition for four materials, pictures of objects, geometrical forms, words, and nonsense syllables. Each subject was shown 15 words successively at intervals of two seconds

each and then required to reproduce those he remembered in three minutes. The subject was then given a set of 30, containing the original 15 words, from which he was to select 15 which he thought were previously presented. The first set of 15 words was shown again as before, and then the subject requested to recall those he could and select 15 from the 30 set. This was continued until he had recognized and recalled all of the 15 words correctly. The experiment was repeated for the three other materials (forms, syllables, and pictures).

The results show that the difference between recall and recognition is greatest for pictures, somewhat less for forms and words, and least for nonsense syllables. In examining the material one finds the pictures offer the greatest richness of associations. The forms, too, can be visualized and in several cases named; the words, which were all nouns, have some associations, but lack a form or picture element. The syllables, as their name implies, were nonsense, most, if not all, of which were devoid of any association.

The individual differences shown by the subjects are rather interesting. The ratio of the greatest number of repetitions to the least number increases as we pass from the pictures to the forms, words, and finally to the syllables for recognition and for recall with the exception of syllables.

From the experiment it may be concluded that the difference between recall and recognition varies with the material to be remembered. The greater the wealth of association offered by the material, the greater the difference between recall and recognition. It is suggestive, at least, that individual differences, especially in recognition, are least when the material is rich with associations and increase as the material has fewer associations.

One of the practical applications is in the selection of trade marks. To be successful a trade mark should be easily recalled and recognized. Arbitrary combinations of letters, like the nonsense syllable, must be presented many more times than pictures or forms, and yet we find the business firms are continually using nonsense material as trade marks.

Some Etiological Factors of Mental Deficiency: MAX G. SCHLAPP. (No abstract received.)

Studies in Recognition: W. S. MONROE. (No abstract presented.)

Sex Differences in the Solution of Mechanical Puzzles: HENRY A. RUGER.

A series of fifteen puzzles, fourteen of which formed a related series involving the same principle, but with increasing complexities, was given to 55 students (30 women and 25 men) in the mechanical drawing classes of Teachers College, and to 23 students (15

women and 8 men) taking an advanced course in mathematics. Thirty minutes were allowed for the test. On the present method of scoring, each puzzle was counted as having a value of 1. As a matter of fact the later numbers were more difficult than the earlier. Weighting the later members would probably enhance the differences to be stated. In the group of 55 students 6⅔ per cent. of the women reached the rank of the median man. In the case of the mathematics group 20 per cent. of the women reached the rank of the median man.

A single puzzle was tried with three other groups of students, chiefly in elementary and secondary education. In group *A*, 5 men and 21 women, 29 per cent. of the women reached or exceeded the position of the median man. In group *B*, 8 men and 22 women, 9 per cent. of the women reached the position of the median man. In Group *C*, 6 men and 25 women, 33 per cent. of the women reached the position of the median man. Group *A* learned the puzzle after being given the theory for it; group *B* unaided, and group *C* by imitation. What part of the actual difference is a true sex difference is not determined.

Apparatus for Demonstration of Monocular and Binocular Factors in the Perception of the Third Dimension of Space: HENRY A. RUGER and J. L. STENQUIST.

The apparatus consists of a box 22½ by 22½ by 36 inches. One end is a ground-glass plate. At the opposite end a monocular aperture is fitted with a photographic diaphragm and shutter for control of size of aperture and length of exposure. The shutter is mounted on a slide which permits the use of binocular vision if desired. The objects are circular discs of different sizes supported from the top of the box by strips of proportional size. These can be readily adjusted for any distance from the eye. Nothing is seen except the discs and strips, and the relative sizes of the retinal images can be varied at will. The entire box is mounted behind screens, with only the eye-piece projecting.

In place of the discs seen against the gray background of glass, electrically lighted boxes with apertures of different sizes can be substituted. The apertures are covered with translucent membranes. By means of rheostats connected with each light the relative brightness of the lights is controlled. These boxes are each adjustable for any distance from the eye.

By suitable adjustments the effect of interference of objects can be measured with either arrangement.

With the daylight form of the apparatus 40 subjects were tested with one setting of the discs. The per cent. of correct judgments was less than that by chance (⅙). There was no correlation with de-

grees of confidence and no sex differences. The judgments both as to size and distance varied within limits of the ratio of 40 to 1.

Is there such a Thing as General Ingenuity? ESTELLE DEYOUNG.

Various psychologists have attempted to prove the existence of definite relations between different mental abilities. The problem suggested itself; Is there such a thing as general ingenuity? Our definite purpose was to select tests having a common element, ingenuity; and to find whether in such a series ability to solve one problem necessarily means ability to solve another.

By ingenuity we mean the use of judgment, logical thought, selection from a mass of material suggested by the problem, and a skill and quickness in manipulating and forming new combinations of possible means for solution.

We presented nine problems to a group of 25 Barnard students. They were in order: (1) a mathematical problem; (2) a test for forming words from the letters in the word "psychiatry" for which five minutes were allowed; (3) a test, which for convenience we called the "limerick," adding two lines of poetry to complete two lines presented; (4) ten syllogisms to be marked either valid or invalid; (5) an original poem of from four to six lines; (6) the absurdity test, or the marking of the absurd sentences in a list; (7) directions; (8) mechanical puzzle, and (9) a puzzle for which thirty minutes was the time limit.

For each individual the score for mathematics consisted of two columns, the time and correctness or incorrectness of the solution; for test 2 the number of words formed; for tests 3 and 5, both the time and order of merit of the poetry; for the syllogisms, the time and the per cent. of correct judgments; for the absurdity and directions the time and number of errors; for the mechanical puzzle only the time, and for the ingenuity, either the time, or if not solved within thirty minutes, the failure.

In every single column the order of merit of the 25 subjects was determined. Where the test consisted of two columns, the order of merit of each individual was averaged so that every test had only one column determining the order of merit of the subject in that ability. The differences in merit for each individual were obtained by comparing each test with every other test.

The results were then obtained by averaging the figures in each of the thirty-six columns and the correlations between the different abilities found by the method of rank differences.

The correlations run as high as .788 for limerick and absurdity; .737 for limerick and directions, and decrease very gradually to three negative correlations which are almost zero: namely, —.032 for

words and mechanical puzzle; —.062 for mathematics and ingenuity, and —.160 for mechanical and ingenuity.

The following are the correlations of each test with the other eight tests:

Limerick	.629
Poem	.575
Directions	.525
Absurdity	.499
Logic	.493
Words	.366
Mathematics	.325
Ingenuity	.285
Mechanical puzzle	.210

The limerick and poem lead. Mathematics stands low in the scale as a representative of ingenious capacity and probably involves a relatively independent trait. The mechanical and ingenuity puzzles on account of their concreteness are not so likely to correlate well with the other tests, which involve mostly ideational processes.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Sul Pragmatismo; Saggi e Ricerche. GIOVANNI PAPINI. Milano: Libraria Editrice Milanese. 1913. Pp. xii + 163.

Giovanni Papini, the aggressive philosopher of Florence, has already been introduced to the readers of this review by William James[1] and Professor Bush.[2] Since James's article the cause of pragmatism in Italy has sustained several losses. The pragmatist periodical, *Leonardo,* which Papini edited, was discontinued in 1907; of its contributors, Vailati passed away (1909), Prezzolini joined the ranks of the idealists, and Calderoni is no longer productive (p. ix). Our author intimates that he, too, has lost some of his former convictions (p. vii). His book, a collection of essays[3] written for the greater part in 1905–06, does not constitute a systematic, still less a complete study of pragmatism. It is nevertheless interesting, mainly because of the personality of its author, a dilettante philos-

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 337–341.

[2] *Ibid.,* Vol. IV., pages 369–371.

[3] The essays contained in this volume, including those reviewed by Professors James and Bush, are the following: "Death and Resurrection of Philosophy," "The Unique and the Diverse," "From Man to God," "Introduction to Pragmatism," "Pragmatism Straightened Out" ("Il Pragmatismo messo in Ordine"), "We Need Not Be Monists," "Will and Knowledge," "Acting Without Feeling and Feeling Without Acting," "The Will to Believe," "Pragmatism and the Political Parties," "Truths for Truth" ("Le verità per la Verità").

opher and writer of short stories, who, although he occasionally breaks through open doors or affects a cryptic style of utterance, more often evinces a keen power of grasping the import of theories and a subtle psychological sense. He has, by the way, written his philosophical autobiography, "Un Uomo Finito."

Our author is an extreme pluralist. Conceiving philosophy as an instrument for man's appropriation of the universe, he sees in the pursuit of the particular or concrete the most direct means of getting at reality (p. 36). Metaphysics, on the contrary, interposes between it and ourselves the screen of general concepts. Since thoroughgoing pluralism is anti-metaphysical, and absolute monism is unintelligible, metaphysic must take refuge in dualism "because it offers the maximum of generality combined with the minimum of comprehension" (p. 27). All the metaphysical systems are mere variations of this proposition: "the universe represents the result of the constant and universal opposition of the classical and the romantic principles, of the unique and the diverse" (p. 32). The intellectual development of Europe continually shows the "classical," *i. e.*, the universal, unitary, and passive, in conflict with the "romantic" principle which includes everything personal, particular, active.

Pragmatism is an attitude destined to give the death-blow to the traditional universalist and inert philosophy. It is not itself a philosophy (p. 69) and is not capable of definition: abhorring simplistic explanations it does not presume to hold one formula or theory as a final solution of all the complexities and perplexities of life. Despite the numerical diversity of pragmatist theories there is a common trait present in all, *viz.*, the recognition of the variable in human aims and activities, the "unstiffening of theories and beliefs." Pragmatism thus presents an attitude of "armed neutrality" with regard to the great questions which agitate mankind, and may be compared to a hotel-lobby (*teoria corridoio*) for the hospitality it gives to divergent pursuits and totally different personalities. Above all pragmatism tends to strengthen our grasp on life and develop all our potentialities. It appeals to our vital instincts and also to sentiments of pessimism and haughtiness. The practical people and the utopians are peculiarly inclined to pragmatism.

One may recognize three varieties of pragmatist theories. One group is concerned with the relation of the particular and the general (Peirce); another selects some particular end and frames theories and modes of representation adapted to it (for instance, Mach's economy of thought, esthetic instincts, satisfaction of curiosity); a third division deals with the culture of faith (*pistica*) and considers the origin of belief and its effect on truth, reality, and conduct. The unity of these three groups is given by their common end, namely, activity, which presupposes the power of prevision and is therefore dependent on the constitution of the exact sciences, *i. e.*, convenient and verifiable information. "From induction to the will to believe there is a continuity which is given by the sole end: the aspiration to activity (Wille zur Macht)" (p. 81). "Prevision being the typical and fundamental content of all knowledge," "the modifica-

tions which the prevision of certain of our capacities of modifying things imposes upon certain other previsions," in other words, the influence of our activity on our knowledge, is one of the fundamental questions of pragmatism. We can trace this influence in our belief in the reality of things we act upon (G. Pikler); in the distinction of primary and secondary qualities; in the preference shown by the sciences to certain hypotheses capable of prevision and verification, for instance, the economic interpretation of history. In short, "Not only knowledge is power, but also power is knowledge."

Voluntary action is defined after Calderoni as "that change of objects among whose causes are found also our beliefs." Belief does not act directly on reality as was held by James; it does not "create its own verification, but merely gives an impulse toward activity, which is the true modifier of reality," James's "will to believe" might be called the "eulogy of risk" since he taught "that the risk of an active choice is preferable to the passive, but implicit choice of skeptic and agnostic inaction" (p. 135). It adds greatly to James's credit to have been the first to recognize the necessity of adventure and plasticity in philosophy. The reciprocal relations of our actions and beliefs give Sig. Papini the opportunity to write an interesting chapter of concrete psychology (eighth essay).

The tenth applies pragmatist principles to the classification of the Italian political parties. That country is blessed with no less than eight (Catholics, Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, Republicans, Socialists, Demochristians, and Anarchists). To accept their political creeds at face value would be an act of unpardonable naïveté, because one and the same slogan may bear a great variety of interpretations and conversely, widely different theories may lead in practise to the same attitude: the socialists, for example, are as intolerant as any ultra-reactionary as soon as they come into power. A pragmatist classification is not the dupe of words. It cuts across every political division and separates the men of action from the mere theorists and sluggards. As for theoretical differences of opinion, only one is significant in practise, namely, the conception of the state's rôle. This classification, therefore, leaves only four active parties: the Clericals and the Socialists on the side of the state's rights and the Liberals and Anarchists on the opposite side. These parties are distinguished from one another by their concern for the welfare of different classes and also by the varying degree of power which they are willing to concede the state.

In his earlier essays Sig. Papini evinced somewhat occult tendencies which required of the reader a good deal of will to believe before he would decide to take them seriously. These leanings are, however, abandoned in the subsequent essays. The last essay on "Truths for Truth," which is dated 1911 and outdistances the others by at least five years, bears witness to a conciliatory and frankly eclectic view of philosophy and metaphysics. The gist of his argument is as follows: The history of philosophy, the great laboratory in which philosophy is making, does not reveal a hopeless conflict of opinions as would appear on superficial observation.

If we institute a critical inventory of the philosophical systems, problems, and solutions, discarding the meaningless and bringing together the redundant or fragmentary, we shall obtain an essential agreement, although the relative prominence of certain principles varies with the different systems. If philosophy is at all to reflect the complexity of life, we must be reconciled to a multiplicity of ends and a corresponding diversity of theories. Although the era of great discoveries in philosophy is past, "possible or imaginary" metaphysics may still be attempted in response to certain artistic, moral, religious, or practical needs.

This philosophy, Sig. Papini rightly observes, is different from both positivism and the eclecticism of Leibniz, Hegel, and Cousin, in that it does not set a single value as the measure of all truths. His attitude presents, I think, many analogies to that of Renan and has its roots in the artistic need of a sympathetic inerpretation of all the aspects of life. It can hardly claim for itself the name of pragmatism if, instead of conceiving pragmatism as a general tendency or attitude, we limit its scope to a definite theory of truth.

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The Socialized Conscience. J. H. COFFIN. Baltimore: Warwick & York, Inc. 1913. Pp. viii + 247.

This book, intended for use as a text-book of ethics, is provided with Questions and Topics for Further Study, and reading-references—to such books as Dewey's and Tuft's "Ethics" (twenty questions and references), Wright's "Self-Realization," Rauschenbusch's two books, Nearing's "Social Adjustment," Hadley's "Standards of Public Morality." Its purpose is to emphasize topics "not ordinarily discussed in books on ethics. But after all, these and their kind are the vital things of life, and they furnish the common every-day questions of morality; they are therefore the things which most need discussion in books on ethics" (p. 74). "To the practical minded student . . . traditional ethics seems to offer little in the way of suggestion for the solution of many of our newly created moral problems. To him the discussions often seem formal and abstract" (Preface).

The gist of this book can be gathered from the following quotations: "It is only half a truth to say that morality is a personal affair; the other half is that personality is a social affair. The influence of nearly all of the ethical theories of the past tends to emphasize the *self*-realization; this is because these theories have been based chiefly upon the assumed principle of individualism. But we must keep constantly before us the social nature of morality, and bear in mind that moral theory, to be adequate to present needs, must be socialized" (pp. 62–3). "In summary we may say that the supreme moral end is the *realization of the social self,* or *socialized personality,* and the moral criterion by which conduct is to be evaluated and directed is the *socialized conscience.* . . . The one common factor that is needed in the solution of the social, political, educational, and religious problems of the present day is a re-enlightened and resensitized consci-

ence" (p. 67). "*Our consciences are not yet socialized!* If some one steals from, cheats, or defrauds me, I have no difficulty in seeing the injustice in the act. But if some one steals from, cheats, or defrauds the public, I regard it as lucky that I got off as easily as I did, and let it go at that, with not a moment's thought of the moral wrong in the case. Now society will not have become thoroughly moral until every member thereof feels the same emotional stirrings when he sees social injustice and wrong in any of these forms, as when injustice or wrong is committed against him personally. This is what is meant by the socialized conscience" (p. 165).[1] The first three chapters and the final chapter develop this point of view genetically and psychologically, the intervening five chapters apply it to the problems of the home, educational agencies, industry, the state, the church.

Excellent is the author's programme and quite in the contemporary current; the accomplishment, alas, is disappointing. There is nothing new in the book, nothing simplified or coordinated, nothing better said than others have said it. It is too fragmentary and sketchy for college classes, not simple enough in statement for secondary schools, not interesting or vivacious enough for the general reader. Although approximately two thirds of the text deals with the concrete applications of social morality, there is little actual grappling with *problems;* we have for the most part preaching, platitude, vague idealism, edifying, but not enlightening. There is much cloudy, unanalyzed statement, and some dubious assertions —especially when the author becomes most eloquent, as, in his longest chapter, in dealing with the evils of divorce and sex-immorality.

In style and form the book is equally unsatisfactory. The phraseology is commonplace, occasionally unidiomatic; there is much careless punctuation, some misspelling—which may be misprinting, as the printer's work has not been perfect. There is at least one attempt to coin a word—*commonality*—which is of questionable utility. The bibliography is given carelessly, without initials, and with several misquoted titles.

Anxiously, then, as many of us are awaiting more concrete and less technical treatments of ethics, and admirable as is the spirit and point of view of this book, we shall hardly be able to use it in our classes.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1914. - *Considérations sur le Repos et le Sommeil* (pp. 113–146): F. LE DANTEC. – Repose signifies, not immobility, but a change of functioning. . . . "Certain operations give me repose from the fatigue resulting from other operations." The state of sleep is characterized by a relative impermeability of the nervous centers, and in this state the individual leads "a more independent life, more approximating absolute life, of assimilation without imitation."

[1] All italics in original.

Bechterew et la Psychologie de Demain (pp. 147–169): N. KOSTYLEFF. – A discussion of the significance of Bechterew's rejection of "consciousness" and the introspective method, and of Bechterew's principle "that every psycho-neural act can be reduced to the schema of a reflex or excitation, reaching the cerebral cortex, awakening traces of anterior reactions, and finding in the latter the factors which determine the process of discharge." *L'Humeur* (pp. 170–188): L. DUGAS. – Humor (disposition, mood, temperament) is an "organic fatality," whose distinctive trait is instability, and is the "irreducible element that every character encloses." *Variétés. Un Philosophe Russe: V. Soloviov:* OSSIP-LOURIÉ. *Analyses et Comptes Rendus.* John Elof Boodin, *Truth and Reality:* A. LALANDE. Shearman, *The Scope of Formal Logic:* HENRI DUFUMIER. Luigi Suali, *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia Indiana:* J. BARUZI. E. Martin, *Psychologie de la Volonté:* FR. PAULHAN. Wincenty Lutoslawski, *Volonté et Liberté:* P. BERROD. Georges Sidney Brett, *A History of Psychology Ancient and Patristic:* FRANÇOIS PICAVET. Notices bibliographiques.

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Coit, Stanton. The Soul of America. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. Pp. xi + 405. $2.00.

Croce, Benedetto. Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx. Tr. by C. M. Meredith. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. Pp. xxiii + 188. $1.25.

Driesch, Hans. The Problem of Individuality. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. Pp. ix + 84. $1.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

PROFESSOR RALPH BARTON PERRY contributes to the July issue of the *Harvard Theological Quarterly* an article on "Contemporary Philosophies of Religion," which closes as follows: "If sober and vigorous thought does not justify hope, then man may well fall back upon his imagination, and nourish illusions that shall be flattering in proportion to their unreality. But this will take care of itself. The optimistic bias of the imagination is the one religious source that will never fail. It should be the part of a philosophy of religion to scan the cosmic horizon for signs that shall be as hopeful as possible but that shall first of all be trustworthy; so that if there be any chance of *really reaching the haven originally desired,* it shall not be lost from a too hasty resignation or abandonment to soothing distraction. A philosophy of religion, in short, should devote itself to the construction, not of the most hopeful belief, but of the most credible hope."